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Abstract 
The 'territory' concept is addressed at a scale rarely envisaged—that of the plot —
through the study of a large rice irrigation perimeter in the heart of the Lake Alaotra region 
in Madagascar. The methodology followed in this study relies on the processing of 
landholding inventories. These inventories are remarquable, first for their quality, as they 
are at the same time quantitative and mapped (GIS-based inventories). They also allow long-
term trend analyses inasmuch as they take place for a long period of time, from 1970 to 
2012. Results of this study consist in two different conclusions: first, an obvious trend for the 
fragmentation (division) of plots and the decrease in the size of holdings is identified, though 
this fragmentation is not equal everywhere. These results confirm the general trend 
observed in lake Alaotra region and in Madagascar regarding land pressure and 
fragmentation due to demographic and other socio-cultural factors. Second, fragmentation 
dynamics hides other less perceptible landholding phenomena. Specifically, it masks land 
grabbing by new and enterprising rice growers who increase their holdings by profiting from 
the problems experienced by the smallest farm owners whose fragmented land is no longer 
viable.  
Keywords 
Madagascar; Lake Alaotra region; Irrigated system; Plot dynamics; Land 
fragmentation; Land grabbing; GIS analysis 
2 
 
1. Introduction 
‘Territory' has now become a key concept in geography and space planning. Though it 
may appear as a polysemous if not a blanket term, territory is generally defined as a socially 
demarcated, appropriated space that is marked by the play of stakeholders and authorities 
at all scales (Moine, 2006; Sack, 1997). Specifically, a territory is indissociable from the 
question of land, as land consists in a finite resource which is appropriated and subject to 
competition (Elden, 2010). The distribution of land, the pressure bearing on it and plot 
division are closely affected by returns on production, by land use and by population 
pressure (Chaléard and Mesclier, 2010).  
However, it is rare to address a territory at a smaller scale, that of the plot, and this is 
the scale used here. Focus is on a large irrigated rice production system, Perimeter PC15 
Marianina Valley, that forms part of the large Malagasy 'rice granary', the Lake Alaotra basin 
(Raunet, 1984) (Figure 1). The perimeter seems basically ambivalent. Although it is 
presented as the most efficient perimeter in the region for both water control and paddy 
rice yields (average 4 t/ha) (Devèze et al., 2003), a number of questions have been raised 
with regard to the sustainability of the irrigation system (Belloncle et al., 2002; Fujiki, 2013; 
Fujiki et al., 2014). The supposed efficiency of the irrigation network contributes to the 
attractiveness of the perimeter and further accentuates the already high population and 
landholding pressure throughout the region (Garin, 1998). This ambivalence echoes the 
international context marked by the calling into question of large hydraulic projects, with 
these being accused of wasting water (Perry et al., 2009), causing various ecological 
constraints and finally representing substantial economic costs (Jamin et al., 2011; Turral et 
al., 2010).  
The research problematics addressed here are based on identifying and explaining 
the landholding dynamics of the perimeter and the territorial strategies used by rice growers 
in the area covered by the irrigation network. A twin hypothesis is put forward: first, in large-
scale quantitative analysis the hyper-fragmentation of land is significant throughout the 
perimeter, forming the ultra-dominant dynamics; second, more detailed local analysis 
reveals very varied and divergent territorial strategies from the abandoning of non-viable 
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plots by farmer-legatees to the systematic purchase of land by newly arrived persons and 
some of the largest landowners.  
It is easy to explain the interest of the subject and two reasons can be put forward. 
First, the scale of the plot is the scale of the lives of farmers, the users of the irrigation 
system. The 'territory' concept has its full significance at this scale as the latter forms the real 
foundation of development of the perimeter and, beyond this, the drainage basin. 
Interventions by the state, by the manager of the perimeter and by donors concerning the 
management of the irrigation and drainage system are made in an extremely complex land 
tenure framework in which common law and modern law (Droy, 1994; Evers et al., 2006), 
and consolidated and allocated lands (Bouderbala et al., 1992) are mingled. This framework 
features a very dense, changing field layout that forms the base for relations and also efforts 
to get the upper hand between owner users and developers. The plot pattern is also the 
basis for relations between persons in the context of an agrarian society marked by the 
power of land. Land forms economic power (today, rice fields are often still the main source 
of household income) (Carimentrand, 2011), symbolic power (rice is still a crop that bears 
prestige and is central to Malagasy identity and myths), a heritage (farmers aim at passing 
on their land—intact or enlarged—to their children) (Funel et al., 1985) and political power 
(the plot layout is the basis for client relations between managers/large landowners and 
clients/tenant farmers) (Blanc-Pamard, 1987). 
Secondly, in the face of landholding pressure that is particularly strong for irrigated 
land in sub-Saharan Africa, with the increase in micro-plots (Blanc-Pamard and Cambrézy, 
1995; Bouderbala et al., 1992), the literature has been focused above all on the interest of 
landholding security and the role of property and tenure on agricultural intensification 
(Bellemare, 2013; De Janvry et al., 2001; Lavigne Delville, 1998; Le Roy et al., 1996). Land 
fragmentation is relatively left aside and often reduced to just one factor among others in 
agricultural productivity. It is essential here to note that a specific definition of land 
fragmentation has been retained for this paper. In our study area, land consolidation 
occurred in the late 1960s, and land ‘lots’ were attributed to each farmer, according to the 
following principle: for each lot, a single owner-operator, a single holding (holding is 
understood in this paper as land ownership) and a single hydraulic unit. This principle did not 
stand for long: indeed, those lots were then divided into plots over the years: this is what is 
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meant here by land fragmentation. Many authors define land fragmentation as the division 
of holdings into several plots that are dispersed over a large area but farmed as single units 
(King and Burton, 1982; Manjunatha et al., 2013; Niroula and Thapa, 2005). In this paper, 
land fragmentation should hence on the contrary be understood as the simple division of 
lots into plots over time (plots with possibly different owners). Nonetheless, if a same lot 
may today be divided into several plots, some holdings may extend in the same way over 
several lots, as some rich owners do not hesitate to buy scattered plots over the perimeter. 
Here, stress is laid on a detailed, mapped study of fragmentation in order to observe the 
precise implications of the phenomenon on the management of a perimeter from both the 
socio-institutional and hydraulic angles. 
A description of the historico-geographic context of the perimeter is followed by 
details of the methodology and then the results of the research. 
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Figure 1. The Lake Alaotra basin (Data: BVLac). 
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2. The context 
The Lake Alaotra region became Madagascar's large rice production centre in the 
twentieth century and now accounts for 1/8 of national production (Carimentrand, 2011). 
However, the history of land development operations illustrates the partial failure of the 
policies applied in the region.  
2.1. Lake Alaotra region: Madagascar's large rice granary 
The Lake Alaotra basin is in the Malagasy highlands. The tropical humid climate is 
tempered by altitude (average inter-annual precipitation 1000 to 1250 mm, 90% of which is 
from November to March)(Garin, 1998; Teyssier, 1994). The region is remarkable for both 
the environment and its rice production. The basin benefits from protection of the wetlands 
by virtue of the Ramsar Convention. The largest lake in the country with an area of 456 km² 
at an elevation of 751.20 m, Lake Alaotra is surrounded by marshland (320 km²) and marshy 
savannah (210 km²) (Ferry et al., 2009). The plains around the lake basin (820 km²) and in 
some twenty adjacent valleys laid out like spokes around the plains are used mainly for 
paddy rice (Figure 1).  
The region gained its status of rice granary little by little during the twentieth 
century, first with impetus from the French colonial administration with, in particular, the 
implementation of various modern hydro-agricultural facilities (main canals, drains, 
diversion intakes and storage dams) in the 1950s, following "Operation Lake Alaotra » 
(Garin, 1998). After independence in 1960, a rural development area (Aire de Mise en Valeur 
Rurale, AMVR) was set up at the site of the large development operations that had been 
completed. It was supervised by SOMALAC (Société d’Aménagement Malgache du Lac 
Alaotra) from 1961 onwards. Most of the large irrigation perimeters shown in figure 1 are 
the direct inheritors of the AMVR. In contrast, the other rice areas were not managed by the 
SOMALAC but were supervised loosely by the Rural Engineering administration (Génie rural) 
(Bouderbala et al., 1992). Little development was done and they have conserved their 
'traditional' character. The SOMALAC had three key tasks in the AMVR: the intensification of 
rice growing, land consolidation and finishing touches to the hydro-agricultural projects 
started during the colonial period (Lapierre, 1964; Société Centrale pour l’Equipement du 
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Territoire, 1965). Although the SOMALAC's position, and hence that of the state, was central 
to the management of the large irrigated perimeters and the rice sector, difficulties 
increased after 1972 and continued until 1982 in the twin context of a socialist revolution 
and the disorganisation of the administration, with the degradation of hydro-agricultural 
infrastructure and the development of a black market running parallel to the state monopoly 
instituted for rice at Lake Alaotra in 1971 (Droy, 1998; Rakoto Ramiarantsoa, 1985). In the 
mid-1980s, within the framework of rehabilitation projects under the aegis of the World 
Bank (Banque mondiale, 1992) and in the context of an international trend aimed at state 
withdrawal in the management of large water facilities (Garces-Restrepo et al., 2007; Turral, 
1995; Turral et al., 2010), the rice sector was liberalised (in 1986 in the region of the lake), 
and perimeter management was decentralised and entrusted to Water Users Associations 
(Associations d’Usagers de l’Eau, AUE), first gradually and then rapidly after the closing down 
of the SOMALAC in 1991 (Direction du Développement et de la Coopération Technique, 
2000). Both institutional and hydraulic management are still very difficult today as the Water 
Users Associations have neither the technical skills nor the financial resources of the 
SOMALAC, in spite of active support from donors (JICA, 2008).  
From this point of view, the PC15- Marianina Valley stands out from the other large 
perimeters in the region by virtue of its mastery of water and high yields (at least in relative 
terms). There are two reasons for this. First; it is one of only two perimeters supplied by a 
storage dam—Bevava dam—that gives it comparatively good assurance of its water (Figure 
2). Second, the perimeter has received particularly close attention from donors with regard 
to the rehabilitation of infrastructure and technico-financial assistance for the AEUs (funding 
from Agence Française de Développement since 1997 and then the BVLac project from 2003) 
(Broutin et al., 2011). The perimeter has an area of 4000 hectares and is divided into two 
ensembles. Upstream, the left bank of the Marianina Valley (1100 ha) was incorporated in 
the irrigation network at a late date: it was only connected to supply from the Bevava in 
1993 when the Main Left Bank Canal (Canal Principal de Rive Gauche – CPRG) was built. 
Historically, the valley is outside the SOMALAC intervention zone and is thus still marked 
today by traditional development works (non-hierarchic irrigation networks, canals dug by 
the farmers). Downstream, PC15 occupies 3000 ha in one of the large plains around the lake; 
it was the pride of the old SOMALAC, with relatively modern hydro-agricultural 
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developments and regular, hierarchic water distribution. Each secondary canal thus feeds a 
hydraulic grid and each tertiary canal feeds a lot (BRL-Madagascar, 2008). The nomenclature 
used in the study to refer to the various components of the perimeter are summarised in 
Table 1: each ensemble (PC15 and the Marianina Valley) is divided into hydraulic sectors, 
each of which includes several users associations; in PC15, each association covers several 
hydraulic grids. 
ENSEMBLE SECTOR AUE 
IRRIGABLE AREA IN 2009 
(ha) 
Marianina 
Valley 
CPRG Upstream 
Ambolotara 333 
Bemanjato 160 
CPRG 
Downstream 
Ambohimasina 329 
Andranomangatsiaka 213 
Ambohibary 97 
PC15 
I8 Upstream 
Grids 1-2-3 334 
Grids 4-7-8 206 
I8 Downstream 
Grids 9-14 197 
Grids 15-16 287 
Grid 21 234 
I2 Upstream 
Grids 5-6 252 
Grids 11-12 170 
Grids 10-13 333 
I2 Downstream 
Grids 17-18 242 
Grids 19-20 249 
Grids 22-23 448 
 
Table 1. Nomenclature of the PC15- Marianina Valley irrigation perimeter (Data: BVLac). 
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Figure 2. The PC15- Marianina Valley irrigation network (Data: BVLac). 
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2.2. The regional history of land development operations: failures and impacts. 
The landholding history of Lake Alaotra and in particular that of the perimeter PC15- 
Marianina Valley shows the failure of the landholding developments undertaken and, 
beyond this, of the regional development policies that supported them. The French colonial 
administration aimed at establishing the region as a rice granary favouring a colonial 
operation model. For this, the engineer Longuefosse delineated Réserves Indigènes (RI) and 
Périmètres de Colonisation (PC) around the lake between 1915 and 1925. The 43 RIs were 
mainly in the valleys adjacent to the lake and were areas already used by and reserved for 
the Madagascans (Marianina Valley became RI 11). In contrast, the 40 PCs around the lake 
were in plains remaining to be cleared and were a priori for European colonists (Garin, 
1998).  
After independence, the government of Madagascar promoted a family farm model, 
specifically in the lake region. The model, created from nothing, aimed at fostering the 
emergence of social development suitable for the intensification of rice growing. It consisted 
of a standard farm under owner occupancy with 5 workers cultivating 5 ha of rice with yields 
in excess of 3 t/ha (Teyssier, 1994). This model was used within the framework of land 
consolidation implemented by the SOMALAC within the limits of the AMVR (Rural 
Development Area). The latter includes the PCs (renamed Périmètres de Culture) that had 
benefited from hydro-agricultural development works, including PC15. In contrast, no land 
redevelopment was performed in the old RIs like the Marianina Valley and that were outside 
the AMVR. Redevelopment was performed in two stages in the mid-1960s. Within the 
AMVR, the land belonging to owners already settled, with a paper title or common law 
ownership, was consolidated, mainly by compulsory purchase. In exchange, the owners 
received a lot of between 5 and 20 ha according to the size of their former holding and their 
former income (consolidated land). The remaining area was distributed as 3 to 5-ha lots to 
landless farmers (allocated land) (Bouderbala et al., 1992; Erismann, 2014; Garin, 1998; 
Louzoun, 1967). After land consolidation and allocation, non owner farming was forbidden 
by SOMALAC regulations and by the law—share-cropping became illegal in 1975 (Droy, 
1998). Similarly, the division and sale of lots were forbidden. There must be just one owner-
operator for each lot. However, it can be seen that the model has weakened. Today, lots 
have been divided into numerous plots and indirect farming has never disappeared from the 
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perimeters. As an example, the upstream part of PC15 is shown in figure 3 with the many 
changes in plot layout in the perimeter over the last 50 years. 
 
Figure 3. Changes in plot layout in the upstream grids of PC15 (Data: BVLac and SCET). 
3. Methodology 
In addition to bibliographical material, research was based mainly on the gathering 
and processing of the plot inventories for perimeter PC15 (Marianina Valley) to show the 
present state and historical dynamics of the plot layout. 
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3.1. The processing of the plot inventories available from 1970 to 2012 
These inventories were drawn up at the end of each cropping season by rice 
extension officers working in the perimeter and corrected by the chief agricultural technician 
on behalf of the federation grouping the 16 AUEs in the perimeter (Fédération des 
Associations des Usagers du Réseau – FAUR). The inventories show the characteristics of 
each plot: its number, the number of the lot to which it belongs, the total area in hectares 
and the area subject to charges for the next season (the two are different if a problem is 
observed), the names and addresses of the owner and the operator. An inventory is 
available for PC15 alone for the 1970 season. This was 'year zero' for the perimeter and 
immediately followed land consolidation. An older inventory (1965) also exists but has not 
been analysed statistically as it is incomplete and is used only as a spatial reference in figure 
3 to illustrate the pre-consolidation situation. An inventory has been drawn up each year 
from 2000 onwards for PC15 and the left bank of Marianina Valley1. A supplementary 
inventory is available for 2012 only for the southern half of PC23, the largest perimeter in 
the region (9200 ha), south-west of the lake (JICA, 2008; SOGREAH and SOMEAH, 1985). 
Geographic comparison means that this inventory sheds light on the specific character of the 
PC15-Marianina Valley perimeter. The five seasons 1970, 2000, 2003, 2008 and 2012 were 
examined; the others were rejected for reasons of shortage of data. The inventories for 
2000, 2003 and 2012 consist of declarations only, so that plot area is estimated but not 
mapped. In contrast, the plot inventory for the two other seasons (1970 and 2008) was 
spatialised and plotted in a vector layer (GIS).  
3.2. A global and local analysis of holding and plot trends in the PC15-Marianina 
Valley perimeter 
The inventories were processed for two purposes. First, this was a diachronic and 
synchronic study of plots in the PC15- Marianina Valley perimeter aimed on the one hand at 
revealing landholding dynamics in the long term (1970 to 2012) and the short term (from 
2000 onwards) and on the other at examining spatial disparities between the two ensembles 
(PC15 and Marianina Valley) and, within each ensemble, between the AUEs and the 
hydraulic grids. Analysis is quantitative and summarises average plot area, holding size and 
                                                     
1 For reasons of convenience, the left bank of the Marianina Valley is henceforth referred to as the 
Marianina Valley. 
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the type of tenure and origin of the owners. It was conducted at hydraulic grid scale for PC15 
and at AUE scale for Marianina Valley2. Results were then analyzed in the light of 
demographic and land data available on a national scale and issued by the Malagasy Ministry 
of Agriculture (Ministère de l’Agriculture, de l’Elevage et de la Pêche, 2007) and by the 
Malagasy censor institute INSTAT (INSTAT, 2013). Though these data presented some 
imprecisions, they allowed interpreting the results of this study in the context of land 
dynamics observed more generally, in Alaotra-Mangoro region and in Madagascar.  
This general analysis was then overlaid by a detailed study of grid 21. First; analysis of 
landholding history was conducted for the ten largest (in area) landowners in PC15 that are 
now sited in grid 213. Second, a typology of agrarian evolution of the lots was drawn up for 
the grid. Grid 21 is particularly suitable for this. It displays a broad range of landholding 
situations and is also rich in terms of political and sociological issues. It has to handle first 
recurrent difficulties in institutional management, especially in the collection of charges, and 
second the strong influence of the inheritors of consolidated land as they are historically 
against any collective management of irrigation (Ratsimba, 2007). Interpretation of the 
results is based in particular on previous studies with more qualitative approaches (Blanc-
Pamard, 1987; Brochoire, 2009; Garin, 1998; Ratsimba, 2007), but also on interviews of 
ricecroppers, technicians, and managers of the federation. 
3.3. Methodology limits: the coexistence of legal and customary land law and the 
difficulty to assess property rights in Madagascar 
Results may finally be misinterpreted if the limits of the inventories are not clearly 
understood. The latter needed corrections of typing and spelling mistakes (the same name 
may be spelled in different ways in different inventories but clearly refer to the same person 
or the same family) in order to follow the histories of the various owners and plots in time. 
However, due to the very large quantity of information involved, with several thousand plots 
to cover and describe for each inventory, these corrections could not be systematic except 
for grid 21.  
                                                     
2 ‘Holdings with areas of less than or more than x hectares’ are a statistic often mentioned in the 
article. To avoid any confusion, it is noted that this is the sum of holdings registered in the same name in a grid 
or an AUE and not among grids and AUEs. 
3 This concerns only the ten largest landowners identified as such. Some cannot be included as the 
various inventories do not necessarily use the same spelling for the same ricegrower in time. 
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Assessing the property rights in the perimeter remains then the greatest challenge. In 
Madagascar, land may be owned through customary rights (lex fori) or positive laws (lex loci) 
(Evers et al., 2013). Official land registration through property titling coexists with customary 
rights: the latter is based on the belief in the absolute right of the first cultivator of a land 
and his descendants called ‘tompon-tany', masters of the land (Evers, 2005, 2006). 
Inheritance appears here as the most legitimate mean to keep a land. Moreover, rather than 
titling a property, or noticing state land administration of a transfer of property (by sale or 
inheritance), owners prefer using the system of ‘petits papiers’ (little documents): these are 
informal land documents ‘authenticated’ by the stamp of a local authority (Teyssier et al., 
2008). Land titling is indeed too long (6 years), too costly, and associated from the point of 
view of the owners to land taxes. Since 2005, a decentralised landholding security policy 
made official this system of ‘petits papiers’, by allowing communes to deliver landholding 
certificates that are much cheaper and quicker to obtain for the ricegrowers than property 
titles (Burnod et al., 2012; Rochegude, 2012; Muttenzer, 2010; Teyssier et al., 2009).  
Inside the PCs, thanks to the land consolidation led in the 1960s, land titling is much 
more widespread than in the rest of the island (Jacoby, 2007): ricegrowers have formal titles 
in about half of the land, and more than 60% for the sole PC15, broadly above the national 
figure (7% of the cultivated area is titled on a national scale). Nonetheless, these titles are 
generally not up to date, and issuance of titles has been steeply decreasing after the end of 
SOMALAC (Penot et al., 2014). In the perimeter and sometimes in the very same plots, may 
then coexist customary, certified and titled properties. The inventories available actually 
refer to the owners who are identified as such by the technicians of the federation, and 
expected to pay the water fee. Land titles and certificates are thus not taken into 
consideration. Due to this difficulty to assess land properties, the inventories cannot be 
exhaustive: certain owners may not be clearly identified, due to their absence when the 
censuses are carried out: 'bad payers' in particular are reluctant for their plots (with the 
water fee due) to be counted. 
15 
 
4. Results and Discussion. 
The results of the study are examined in two parts. First, analysis of the general 
landholding characteristics of the perimeter show the hyper-fragmentation of plots and 
holdings from 1970 to 2012 and the geographical ambivalence of the perimeter—between 
PC15, marked by land consolidation, and Marianina Valley, that has inherited the non-
egalitarian structures of the Sihanaka regional ethnic groups. Second, the case study devoted 
to grid 21 provides local details of the general features observed for PC15 as a whole and the 
drafting of a preliminary typology of the territorial strategies implemented by the users of 
the network. 
4.1. General landholding dynamics tending towards the hyper-fragmentation of 
plots 
After a preliminary geographic comparison of the various ensembles studied (PC15, 
Marianina Valley and PC23), examination of the dynamics of the hyper-fragmentation of 
PC15 was followed by investigation of social inequality with regard to access to land in the 
perimeter. Finally, causes of land fragmentation were identified with regard to the 
landholding and demographic trends observed on a regional and national scale.  
4.1.1. Synchronic geographic analysis: general features of plot layout in 2012. 
The general landholding features of each ensemble in 2012 are shown in Table 2. This 
shows the specific nature of perimeter PC15-Marianina Valley at the regional scale in 
comparison with PC23 and the ambivalence of the perimeter between upstream (Marianina 
Valley or M. V.) and downstream (PC15). 
 
 
 
 
16 
 
Plot layout 
Owner-occupied 
plots (% of the 
total) 
Average plot size 
(ha) 
Percentages of total plots whose sizes are as follows or less: 
0.25 ha 0.5 ha 1 ha 3 ha 5 ha 
PC23 
Average 72,1% 2,58 - 10,0% 35,1% 81,0% 96,1% 
Maximum for a grid 94,4% 3,51 - 37,0% 60,0% 98,2% 100,0% 
Minimum for a grid 54,8% 1,26 - 0,0% 5,3% 57,8% 78,9% 
PC15 
Average 62,8% 0,90 21,4% 51,9% 79,1% 98,0% 99,6% 
Maximum for a grid 88,4% 1,26 36,0% 72,0% 96,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
Minimum for a grid 36,8% 0,56 8,7% 36,1% 63,9% 91,9% 98,1% 
M.V. 
Average 58,6% 0,69 29,3% 55,1% 80,9% 98,7% 99,5% 
Maximum for an AUE 69,6% 1,01 40,3% 65,3% 87,2% 99,2% 100,0% 
Minimum for an AUE 28,5% 0,53 8,1% 30,1% 66,7% 95,3% 98,7% 
Holding size 
Percentages of the areas of holdings as 
follows or larger: 
Percentages of the areas of holdings as 
follows or smaller: 
3 ha 5 ha 10 ha 0,25 ha 0,5 ha 1 ha 
PC23 
Average 66.3% 37.0% 11.0% - 1.3% 9.2% 
Maximum for a grid - 60.4% 49.9% - 8.6% 21.0% 
Minimum for a grid - 0.0% 0.0% - 0.0% 1.5% 
PC15 
Average 37.7% 9.0% 2.5% 3.4% 14.1% 33.8% 
Maximum for a grid 56.2% 24.1% 13.9% 7.9% 30.9% 62.7% 
Minimum for a grid 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.7% 6.4% 17.2% 
M.V. 
Average 31.9% 22.2% 11.4% 3.4% 12.5% 30.6% 
Maximum for an AUE 71.4% 65.4% 61.4% 5.4% 16.5% 40.1% 
Minimum for an AUE 18.1% 3.4% 0.0% 0.3% 3.3% 13.4% 
 
Table 2. Synchronic comparison of landholding in perimeters PC23 and PC15- Marianina Valley in 2012 (Data: FAUR and 
JICA). 
 
First of all, PC23 is clearly different to PC15-Marianina Valley. It is markedly 
fragmented with average plot size of 2.58 ha per plot with only just 35% of plots of 1 ha or 
less. It also has many large holdings (holdings of 5 ha account for more than a third of the 
total area) and very few small holdings (9% of the area consists of holdings of 1 ha or less). 
Rice growers consider PC23 to be fairly unattractive for reasons of poor water management 
and extremely low yields. These features save the perimeter from fragmentation and 
account for the maintaining of a significant number of large and medium-sized holdings. 
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In contrast, PC15 is both fragmented—average plot size 0.9 ha and half of the plots 
being 0.5 ha or less—and marked by the small number of large holdings (9% of the area of 
PC15 is accounted for by holdings with an area of 5 ha or more in comparison with a third of 
the total consisting of holdings of 1 ha and less) because of very strong pressure on 
landholding. 
Finally, Marianina Valley is both very strongly fragmented (average plot size 0.7 ha) 
and displays considerable differences in holdings. The valley has both numerous small 
holdings (a third of the area is accounted for by holdings of 1 ha or less) and powerful large 
holdings (holdings of 10 ha or more account for 11% of the area of the valley and those of 5 
ha account for 22%). The reason is Marianina Valley's former status of Réserve Indigène, 
which involves two considerations. First, it was a reserve and concessions (property titles) 
were awarded during the colonial period. Although the European concessions were 
nationalised and redistributed in 1973, those awarded to Madagascans remained intact. 
Second, the reserves were peopled to a considerably extent by Sihanakas or former Merina 
migrants integrated in Sihanaka society, whereas the new migrants tended to settle in the 
PCs (Garin, 1998); however, Sihanaka social structure is very divided, ranging from large 
landholders who use landless sharecropper and small landholders scattered over the very 
fragmented plot layout.  
4.1.2. The failure of the family farm model and landholding convergence between 
PC15 and Marianina Valley: non-owner occupancy and hyper—fragmentation  
Despite land consolidation, PC15 experienced an exponential growth of the number 
of farmers, resulting in two features: hyper-fragmentation and the development of non-
owner occupancy. Due to the failure of the family farming model promoted by the 
SOMALAC, PC15 have become relatively similar to Marianina Valley in its plot structure. 
Non-owner occupancy (leasing and share-cropping) was forbidden after land 
consolidation. However, it appeared suddenly at the end of the 1980s under effect of 
internal immigration (new arrivals after consolidation found it difficult to acquire land in 
PC15) and the liberalisation of the economy from 1984-1986 onwards. In 1980-1981, owner 
occupancy still concerned 80% of farmers in PC15 villages in comparison with 65% in 
Marianina Valley, in 1993 owner occupancy was down to 69% in PC15 but was still the same 
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in Marianina Valley (Garin, 1998). The trend has been stable since then: 37% of the plots in 
PC15 are under owner occupancy and 41% in Marianina Valley. As a comparison, the 
proportion does not exceed 28% in PC23 (Table 2), 25% of lowlands in the lake Alaotra area 
and 10% of lowlands on a national scale (Jacoby, 2007). However, two objections can be 
made to these figures. Firstly, one form of semi-share-cropping involving occasional work 
carried out by landless share-croppers on holdings belonging to large Sihanaka owners in 
exchange for cash loans, rice or equipment is too informal and volatile to be taken into 
account in the inventories (Charmes, 1973, 1975). Secondly, slight variations in occupation 
status from one year to the next can be seen during the period examined (2000-2012): from 
29% in 2008 and 35-37% in the other seasons in PC15 and between 36% and 44% in 
Marianina Valley. These variations seem to be correlated partially with fluctuations in paddy 
production: after a good harvest the owner cultivates his plot himself but not after a 
mediocre harvest, according to Blanc-Pamard (1987). 
Although the development of non-owner occupancy was very sudden in PC15, 
fragmentation has been an underlying feature: average plot area decreased gradually from 
some 3.3 ha in 1970 to 1.39 ha in 2000 and 0.90 ha in 2012. The impact of fragmentation is 
shown on a local scale, in a plot map of grids 1, 2 and 3 in the upstream part of PC15 (Figure 
3). At the scale of the whole PC15 (Figure 4), the overall fragmentation coefficient of lots 
reaches 2.27, meaning that each lot has been fragmented in average in 2.27 plots. There are 
nonetheless strong disparities between lots. In the 668 analysed, 19% have not been 
fragmented and 18% have been divided in two in comparison with nearly 60% that have 
been fragmented into 3 to 10 plots. 
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Figure 4. Fragmentation of the original lots in PC15 from 1970 to 2012 (Data: FAUR). 
 
There has been an increasing trend for the formation of micro-plots of 0.5 ha or even 
0.25 in the last 12 years (Figure 5). In PC15, plots with an area of 0.5 ha or less already 
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formed a third of plot distribution in 2000 and more than half in 2012; 0.25 ha plots were in 
a clear minority in 2000 and accounted for more than a fifth of plots in 2012. However, 
strong spatial disparities are seen in figure 6 that shows the situation in 2008. Incidentally, 
comparison of PC15 with Marianina Valley reveals astonishing dynamics. Fragmentation of 
plots in the valley was even more sudden than in PC15. In 2000, 0.25 ha plots formed 11% of 
the total but flirted with 30% in 2012! The proportion of 0.5 ha plots practically doubled 
during the same period (from 30% to 55%) during the same period. The main areas 
concerned are the upstream and central parts of the valley: the proportion of 0.25 ha plots is 
2.5 times greater at Ambolotara, 5 times greater at Bemanjato and 4 times greater at 
Ambohimasina. In contrast, the lower part of the valley (especially Andranomangatsiaka) has 
been spared by hyper-fragmentation. This spatial dichotomy is very clear in figure 7. 
 
 
Figure 5. Evolution of the proportion of micro-plots in PC15 and the Marianina Valley from 2000 to 2012 (Data: FAUR). 
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Figure 6. Plot layout of PC15 in 2008 (Data: BVLac). 
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Figure 7. Plot layout of Marianina Valley in 2008 (Data: BVLac). 
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4.1.3. Changes in the size of holdings from 1970 to the present day: marked 
disparities between Marianina Valley and PC15. 
The area of holdings also tends to change, simultaneously with fragmentation. Small 
holdings are the first to be affected. Conversely, at least in Marianina Valley, large holdings 
conserve a degree of inertia and pre-eminence. 
First of all, the average size of small holdings decreased from 2000 to 2012 (Figure 8). 
In PC15, the area covered by small holdings of 1 ha or less doubled during the period in 
question and formed a third of the total area in 2012, with accentuated pressure in the 
upstream part. The trend has been the same in the Marianina Valley, but with faster 
development of micro-holdings (0.5 ha and less) that formed 5% in 2000 but reached 13% in 
2012, with their number increasing mainly in the upstream part of the valley. These features 
lead to deducing that fragmentation is certainly the direct consequence of the decrease in 
the average size of holdings. 
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Figure 8. Proportion of the area devoted to small holdings from 2000 to 2012 – average and the extreme values in a grid 
or for an AUE in PC15 and the Marianina Valley (Data: FAUR). 
 
Secondly, the increase in the number of micro-holdings contrasts with the 
maintaining of the largest ones, mainly in the Marianina Valley. Inequality in landholding 
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between large landowners and small operators (small owner farmers or landless 
sharecroppers) is therefore increasingly marked. Figure 9 highlights the significant decrease 
in the area of large and medium-sized holdings in PC15 and, in contrast, the very measured 
decrease in the Marianina Valley.  
In PC15, the decrease in medium-sized holdings (3 ha and more) was already strongly 
marked from 1970 to 2000 (100% to 66% of the area) and accelerated exponentially from 
2000 to 2012 (when these holdings formed only 38% of the area). Larger holdings (5 ha or 
more) displayed a similar pattern, covering 22% of the area in 1970 and 15% in 2000 before 
plunging to less than 10% in 2012. Although very large holdings (10 ha and more) remained 
practically intact until the beginning of the 2000s, they are now being broken up: they 
covered only 2.5% of the area in 2012. Here, the holding owned by the bishopric of 
Ambatondrazaka is a surprising exception in PC15. A single lot united in a single plot, it has 
consisted of 35 ha of rice fields in grid 1 ever since land consolidation; it appears very clearly 
in figures 3 and 6. 
The situation is very different in the Marianina Valley with inequality as regards 
access to land and, as a result, the 'untouchability' of the largest holdings. Dominated by the 
opposition between large and small holdings, the Marianina Valley has—historically—few 
holdings of intermediate size, unlike PC15 where the holdings have been of average size in 
the past. Holdings of 3 to 5 ha covered only 10% of the area in 2012. Large and very large 
holdings are much more frequently seen in the valley than in PC15 and, surprising, they 
hardly decreased during the period examined. Holdings of 5 ha or more covered 24% of the 
area in 2000 and 22% in 2012 and holdings of 10 ha and more remained completely stable at 
18% from 2000 to 2008. The decrease observed from 2008 to 2012 (from 18% to 11%) 
results mainly from the division by inheritance of the 48-ha holding of Jacquis R. into six 8-ha 
holdings within the framework of the association Ambohimasina. Large holdings are 
concentrated in the downstream part of the valley and especially in Andranomangatsiaka. 
Here, the large holdings were originally colonial concessions and have now become 
undivided holdings belonging to all the inheritors of the initial purchase and management is 
handled by two or three of their representatives. The latter pay an annual lump sum tribute 
to the rest of the family, who live in Antananarivo or abroad. These large holdings give 
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evidence of the rights traditionally recognized to the descendants of first comers (Evers, 
2006, 2005). 
 
Figure 9. Proportion of the area occupied by large and medium-sized holdings from 1970 to 2012: average for PC15 and 
the Marianina Valley (Data: FAUR). 
 
4.1.4. Local, regional, and national causes for land fragmentation and holding size 
reduction 
Local explanations for land fragmentation, with its implications regarding holding 
average size, are put into perspective with what is already known on regional and national 
scales. 
On a local scale, PC15 and Marianina Valley benefit from one of the best irrigation 
systems in lake Alaotra region, leading to paddy yields superior to 4 tons per hectare (at a 
national level, yields are about 2.5 tons per hectare)(Fujiki, 2013). The perimeter appears 
then attractive to migrants. This phenomenon is aggravated by the practice of inheritance in 
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equal shares, customary among the farmers in the region (Brochoire, 2009) and enticed by 
the 1968 law on inheritance (USAID, 2010). Only 4% of the owners in PC15 are the original 
owners who experienced land consolidation (Ratsimba, 2007), while legatees—sometimes 
fourth generation—form 75% of owners in PC15. This practice thus leads to the partitioning 
of the inherited land.  
Regarding Marianina Valley in particular, other reasons may explain the accelerated 
fragmentation recently observed. It is due to the incorporation of the valley in the irrigated 
perimeter (creation of the Canal Principal de Rive Gauche – CPRG in 1993), with two main 
consequences. First, it increased the attractiveness of the valley and thus accelerated 
fragmentation that was already strongly marked for historical reasons (no consolidation and 
dominance of the Sihanaka agrarian structure). Second, ricecroppers were asked to regroup 
their lands with one another by the AUE – a minimum theoretical threshold of 2 hectares for 
each plot was required if a ricecropper wanted to be connected to the irrigation network, 
and admitted into the federation. Once the ricecroppers had their lands connected, they 
came back to the original situation – therefore, this fictitious land consolidation did not last 
long, explaining why fragmentation is even more acute in Marianina Valley than in PC15. 
Those local factors are aggravated by the demographic pressure. On a regional and 
national scale, an intense population growth leads to a strong pressure on land, as 
Madagascar remains a rural country – 67% of the population is currently living in the 
countryside, and only one tenth of incoming working population in the decade 2010 will be 
absorbed by jobs in urban areas according to Dabat (2008). Between 1993 and 2011, annual 
growth of population reached 3.9% in Madagascar and 3.3% in the Alaotra-Mangoro region. 
Between the two census made by the Malagasy Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and 
Cattles, in 1985 and 2005, there was a decrease of available area cultivated per inhabitant, 
from 0.21 ha to 0.16 ha (here, only farming population is considered). Mean holding size 
decreased in the mean time from 1.2 ha to 0.87 ha on a national scale. Average holding size 
in the Alaotra-Mangoro region though remains a bit larger, with 1.10 ha available per 
inhabitant in 2005, so that farming population growth and land fragmentation potential are 
even higher.  
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 In conclusion, there is a trend for the fragmentation of plots and a decrease in the 
size of holdings in the perimeter PC15-Valley Marianina, which echoes the trends observed 
on a regional and a national level. A distinction may be drawn nevertheless between PC15, 
where both large and small holdings are fragmented, and the Marianina Valley where 
inequality in access to land is acute, with the cohabitation of large, permanent holdings and 
micro-holdings that are below the viability threshold. However, general fragmentation 
dynamics hides other shorter-lived but symbolically important phenomena whose long-term 
sociological and political implications are still difficult to evaluate. This concerns in particular 
the problem of land grabbing by certain landowners.  
4.2. The multiplicity of landholding strategies at plot scale: a case study for a 
hydraulic grid (grid 21) 
The analysis below for grid 21, a large hydraulic grid in the downstream part of PC15, 
is aimed firstly at identifying the land acquisition strategies used by certain large landowners 
and secondly at drawing up a typology of lots’ evolutions. 
4.2.1. The territorial strategies of large landowners: conservation of a 
landholding heritage and purchase of land 
In PC15, against the general trend for a reduction in the size of holdings, middle class 
urban newcomers (from outside the perimeter) and large landowners are succeeding in 
purchasing land to increase the size of their holdings. However, the land grabbing dynamics 
that can be seen in the perimeter are of local-scale. They do not involve large scale 
acquisitions by foreign agro-business investment, like Daewoo's cancelled project aiming at 
purchasing 1,300,000 ha of land (Burnod et al., 2013; Evers et al., 2011). They do not involve 
either environmentalists’ pressures as observed otherwise in Madagascar (Seagle, 2012), 
even though PC15 is included into the lake Alaotra area protected by the Ramsar 
convention.  
It is to be noted here that the lake Alaotra area is notable for the extent of land 
market activity. Nationally only 13% of lowland plots (mostly paddy fields) in rural areas are 
purchased, against 40% in the lake Alaotra region (Jacoby, 2007). PC15 appears to be in 
between (Brochoire, 2009), with a land market a bit less open than in the rest of the area 
due to the strong pressure on land and the number of titled properties – the latter indeed 
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are less subject to sales, according to Jacoby (2007). Sales mainly concern the southern part 
of the perimeter where there is slightly less saturation and less property titling. 
Purchasers in PC15 may be native from the region or be migrants coming from the 
national capital Antananarivo or from Antsirabe. The newcomers settle in lake Alaotra region 
to make their fortune with a start-up capital – they are not strictly ricegrowers but also have 
other complementary activities such as transport business or large dairy cattle breeding. 
Purchasers have two main buying strategies. First, they may use the 'vary maitso' (green rice 
system). This consists of lending money to rice growers in difficulty between harvests and, 
after the harvest, taking repayment in paddy rice at a third of the market price. They use this 
system of usury to build up capital that they invest in land. These buyers concentrate on 
small ricegrowers who are in debt and who prefer to sell their assets rather than be liable to 
seizure. Those small ricegrowers keep the remaining proceeds of the sale to buy cheaper 
land downstream of the perimeter near the marshes. A second buying strategy aims at 
leasing for several years a land from a small owner in financial difficulty. After several years 
of renewable leasing (or sharecropping) agreements, the owner generally decides to sale its 
land to its tenant. This is an example of reverse tenancy, when the landlord appears to be 
poorer than its tenant. This trend has already been observed in lake Alaotra region by 
Bellemare (2009).   
Examination of the histories of the ten largest landowners currently established in 
grid 21 (summarised in Table 3) highlights these purchase strategies. In addition, the table 
shows the history of five other ricegrowers outside grid 21; one of them (Rak.) own the 
largest lot in grid 15, as can be seen clearly in figure 6. Study of the ten owners in grid 21 
show their specific features and also echo the overall dynamics described above, providing a 
key to understanding them: 
(1) Whereas the overall area of their holdings in PC15 as a whole tended to grow, 
increasing from an average of 5.2 ha in 2000 to 7.4 ha in 2012 (Table 3), the 
number of lots occupied by these owners increased from an average of 1.9 to 3.9 
during the same period. In fact these growing estates are scattered and, 
seemingly paradoxically, contribute to fragmentation. This trend seen in PC15 
contrasts with that observed in the Marianina Valley where block holdings that 
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were former colonial concessions are dominant. Indeed, the spatial inertia of 
large estates is comparatively smaller in PC15. 
(2) Actively involved in ricegrowing in the perimeter, nine out of ten (the exception 
being Ral.) of these large landowners cultivate their rice fields on an owner 
occupancy basis. Three ricegrowers who are not from grid 21 (Jean R., Jean-
Baptiste R. and Albert R.) became incorporated in the grid initially as ordinary 
farmers before purchasing various plots in some of the most fragmented lots. The 
most recent purchasers favour owner occupancy in order to guarantee their land 
rights and to limit the risk of dubious advantages being taken by tenants. This is a 
serious risk in the Lake Alaotra region and may be a reason among others for the 
stabilisation of owner occupancy in PC15 during the last 15 years.  
 1970 2000 2003 2008 2012 
Large landowners in grid 21      
Average number of lots occupied by each 
ricegrower  1 1.9 2.8 3.6 3.9 
Average area owned by each ricegrower (ha) 4.75 5.17 6.36 6.98 7.43 
Area of the holdings of each ricegrower (ha):           
Raj. 6.5 6 10 12.25 13.75 
Jean R.   8 8.5 7.25 10.25 
Ral.   5 8.8 8.55 7.45 
Ernest R.   6.5 6.5 7.75 7 
Thomas R.   1 3 8.25 7 
Bernadette R.   6.5 8.5 4 6.5 
Flavien R.   6.55 5.3 6.55 6.25 
Albert R. 3 4 4.5 4.75 5.75 
Jean Baptiste R.   4 4 5.5 5.5 
Célestine R.  4.17 4.52 4.92 4.85 
Other large landowners 
(other than in grid 21)      
Area of the holding of each ricegrower (ha):      
Rak. (strong presence in grid 15) 13.5 16.17 14 14 13.75 
Jules R. (grids 13 and 14)  5.85 7.25 11.5 12 
Georges L. T. (grid 11)  0 7 11.5 11.5 
Henri R. (grid 17)  5 9.15 10.5 10.5 
Claire R. (grid 14)  12 12 12 10 
 
Table 3. Evolution of the holdings of 15 large ricegrowers in PC15 from 1970 to 2012 (Data: FAUR). 
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4.2.2. Typology of lots’ trends 
Beyond the general trends already described for the perimeter, the evolution of plot 
layout involved many factors at lot scale. The lots in grid 21 were classified using a typology 
with two entries—cohesion of the lot and evolution of the ownership to illustrate plot 
dynamics and the distribution of holdings. Lot cohesion was evaluated for 2012 using two 
criteria: the presence of one or several owners in the lot and owner or non-owner 
occupancy. The five inventories available (1970, 2000, 2003, 2008 and 2012) showed holding 
dynamics and the frequency and nature of transfers in each lot, with distinction made 
between four possibilities: (1) no transfers (the owner has not changed since 1970), (2) rare 
changes of ownership (only one of the inventories available reports a transfer of ownership), 
(3) gradual or partial transfer of ownership of the lot by the original owner spread over 
several inventories, and (4) frequent changes in ownership (at least two of the five 
inventories report transfers of ownership). 
Analysis of this typology is shown in synthesis form in Table 4 and figure 10 and 
reveals opposing trends within grid 21. The main dynamics can be identified: avatars of the 
former 'SOMALAC model', seeming stable lots with several owners (‘multiple holdings’ lots) 
and finally 'precarious' holdings. 
(1) The family farming 'SOMALAC model' based on the farming of an entire lot by a 
single owner-operator still has a degree of prevalence and concerns a fifth of the 
lots in all. In addition to the original owners—those who experienced the land 
consolidation of the 1960s (4 holdings out of 70)—it also included sole inheritors 
or former operators who have become owners of the lots. 
(2) Stable lots with multiple owners form about half of the lots in grid 21. Here, 
distinction should be made between lots in which transfers of ownership are rare 
(20%) and those in which transfers are gradual or partial (29% of the lots). This 
category also includes both divisions of the lots by inheritance and transfers to 
former operators.  
(3) Slightly less than a third of the lots display frequent transfers and these are 
considered here as representing a priori a certain precariousness in ownership. 
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Transfers by purchase seem more frequent in this category, as do owners from 
towns. In grid 21 as a whole, owners include persons from town in nine lots and 
five of these are considered as being precarious. The owners are generally from 
Ambatondrazaka, except in one case where they are from the capital 
Antananarivo (lot 2147). 
Finally, it is interesting to note that from the spatial point of view the most stable lots 
are close to canal I8, whereas the most precarious ones are adjacent to drain D8 (Figure 2). 
The rice fields closest to the irrigation canals are also those that receive more regular 
irrigation and so the yields are more stable, in contrast with the rice fields close to the drains 
(Fujiki, 2013). Land considered as being the least productive will thus be sold more readily. 
Technical disparities therefore appear to be a key factor in landholding inequality and the 
geographic distribution of such inequality. 
 
Lot cohesion (2012) Ownership dynamics (1970, 2000, 2003, 2008, 2012) 
Ownership structure 
Main tenure 
system 
Original owner 
Stable ownership. 
rare transfers 
Gradual or partial 
land transfer 
Precariousness. 
Frequent transfers 
Single or joint 
ownership 
Owner 5.8% 13.0% - 1.4% 
Non-owner 4.3% 1.4% - 0.0% 
Multiple owners 
Owner - 8.7% 17.4% 17.4% 
Non-owner - 11.6% 11.6% 7.2% 
 
Table 4. Typology of landholding dynamics in grid 21: proportional distribution by lot as % of the total (Data: FAUR). 
 
To conclude, analysis of grid 21 shows the dynamics at the scale of PC15. Firstly, 
inequality is increasing between the great majority of ricegrowers whose holding size 
decreases from one generation to the next and, in the most extreme cases, from one poor 
season to another, and a few landowners who succeed in increasing their holdings by using 
an active land grabbing strategy. Secondly, although trends in land ownership transfer move 
overall towards the division of lots, they also and above all reveal the increasing instability 
weighing on the status of some landowners. 
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Figure 10. Cartography of landholding dynamics in grid 21: typology by lot (Data: FAUR). 
5. Conclusion  
Analysis of landholding dynamics at perimeter scale shows a trend for fragmentation 
and even hyper-fragmentation and a decrease in the size of holdings. However, there are 
strong disparities between the Marianina Valley, where large holdings with more than 5 
hectares of land remain solidly established and maintain strong spatial cohesion, and PC15 
which features the generalised division of holdings and a spatial dispersion of the largest.  
The dynamics identified at the scale of the perimeter result in a host of situations at 
more local scales. The fragmentation of lots leads to instability of plot structure and also to 
greater agrarian precariousness and incertitude with regard to the status of owners and 
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operators. Property transfers accelerate, as does the turnover in operators. Such instability 
is an opportunity for the wealthiest and most enterprising ricecroppers to implement land 
grabbing strategies by profiting from the fragility and difficulties of the majority. The 
landholding structure of PC15 has become flexible, featuring socio-spatial contradictions 
that become more marked every year, with exaggerated differences in wealth, dynamics and 
strategies. Far from being uniform, the perimeter area is made up of a patchwork of plots 
and holdings whose boundaries are changing more and more rapidly.  
Consequences of land fragmentation and land grabbing may be observed on different 
levels. On a global level, fragmentation has got implications on population poverty, as 
already observed in other parts in the country. Poverty is indeed strongly correlated with 
holding and plot size, the poorest groups having the least lands (Stifel, 2010). If average 
holding size in Madagascar lies around 0.8 ha, poorest households only have an average of 
0.5 ha against 1.8 ha for the wealthiest (USAID, 2010). Land fragmentation appears then 
fundamentally as a social problem, in the perimeter as in the rest of Madagascar. 
On a local level, these landholding upsets have an impact on the collective 
management of the perimeter and especially the hydraulic aspect. As has already been 
noted, the lot is the basic unit of the land redevelopment performed in the 1960s, but it is 
also the hydraulic unit in PC15. The hydraulic network was originally laid out to supply entire 
lots. The more a lot is divided, the more complicated the water distribution to the various 
fields. Fragmentation implies technical problems (how can all the plots in the same lot be 
irrigated?) that result in informal solutions (small farm channels are dug, frequently wasteful 
cascade irrigation is used) and also problems of relations between people. Fragmentation 
results in competition for access to the irrigation network between the different operators in 
the same lot. Under such conditions, the common interest of the different ricecroppers risks 
to be called into question, putting finally at stake the sustainability of the network. 
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